Abstract-Military communities have come to rely heavily on commercial off the shelf (COTS) standards and technologies for Internet of Things (IoT) operations. One of the major obstacles to military use of COTS IoT devices is the security of data transfer. In this paper, we successfully design and develop a lightweight, trust-based security architecture to support routing in a mobile IoT network. Specifically, we modify the RPL IoT routing algorithm using common security techniques, including a nonce identity value, timestamp, and network whitelist. Our approach allows RPL to select a routing path over a mobile IoT wireless network based on a computed node trust value and average received signal strength indicator (ARSSI) value across network members. We conducted simulations using the Cooja network simulator and Wireshark to validate the algorithm against stipulated threat models. We demonstrate that our algorithm can protect the network against Denial of Service (DoS) and Sybil based identity attacks. We also show that the control overhead required for our algorithm is less than 5% and that the packet delivery rate improves by nearly 10%.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of Internet of Things (IoT) enabled devices for military operations has gained traction in recent years due to its rapid speed to market and cost effectiveness [1] . The widespread adoption of IoT networks will significantly impact military communities as sensors become further miniaturized and energy efficient [2] . In recent years, various military communities have moved away from using proprietary technologies to using commercial off the shelf (COTS) devices for IoT operations [3] [4] .
A. Research Motivations and Contributions
One of the major obstacles to military use of COTS IoT devices is the security of data transfer [4] . This concern is more acute when IoT sensors are used as mobile devices for tracking of troop locations and patrolling areas of interest [5] . To support mobile IoT networks, the demand on mobility and security pose additional challenges to the network's underlying communications protocols. Since an IoT network is comprised of a suite of low power devices, the processing power and routing functions for data are limited. In addition, the routing protocol for an IoT network has to be modified to support mobile connectivity. According to [6] , the security implementations for most COTS IoT enabled devices are limited U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright and a third party can access these devices easily. This paper studies and modifies a common IoT routing protocol known as the routing protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL), to deliver trust-based routing in a mobile IoT network. While RPL is a well-established routing protocol for IoT networks [7] , security implementations in this area are usually inadequate. RPL is subject to various forms of network attacks, primarily targeted to the disruption of routing paths and the alteration of control messages [8] , [9] .
In this paper, we design and develop a trust-based security architecture for RPL such that it can be used to detect external attacks in a mobile IoT setting. While the architecture was formulated and developed based on commonly known security mitigation techniques which include nonce identity, timestamping, and network whitelist, the combination of these parameters for RPL is unique to this paper. Our approach allows RPL to select an optimal routing path over the IoT mobile network based on a computed node trust value and average received signal strength indicator (ARSSI) value across network members. The nonce value, network whitelist and timestamp are used to ensure the integrity of the control messages in transit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the related work. Section III discusses the trust-based security architecture for RPL. Section IV describes the experimental setup and the simulation model used. The simulation results and performance analysis are detailed in Section V. We conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In the last several years, researchers have identified security and privacy challenges in IoT networks [6] [10] [11] [12] [13] . In [8] and [9] , the authors summarized the routing attacks against RPL and provided various countermeasures that complement the existing routing protocol.
Researchers have also studied ways to enhance the performance of IoT devices in a wireless mobile network. In [14] and [15] , the authors propose novel methods to enhance RPL routing performance in a mobile setting through the use of signal strength indicators and timers.
The authors in [16] proposed a real-time intrusion detection system (IDS) for IoT networks, primarily targeting routing threats such as sinkhole attacks. The authors adopt a centralized IDS architecture which uses timestamps to deal with replay attacks. While the scheme requires a centralized architecture in the computation of timestamp information, we assessed that this information can be maintained and shared locally in a distributed-manner across network members and is adopted as part of our security design.
III. LIGHTWEIGHT TRUST-BASED SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE FOR RPL RPL must ensure protection in terms of identity verification and message integrity. It is assumed that confidentiality protection such as encryption is implemented at the MAC layer [12] .
A. Basics of RPL
RPL is the standard protocol to support routing for IoT devices [8] . The network path information is constructed using a tree topology and is organized as a set of destination oriented directed acyclic graphs (DODAG) between nodes. According to [7] , the architecture of the RPL network is distinguished by two key parameters: DODAG ID and Rank. Each DODAG has an identifier, known as a DODAG ID, which is represented by the IPv6 address of the root node. Within each DODAG, the nodes are connected in a tree-like manner according to their rank.
The rank of each node represents its relative position to the root node in the DODAG tree. The root node, also known as the sink node, has the lowest rank of 1. The sink node is usually the border router, which connects to the external world or Internet. A node's rank increases the further away it is from the root node. All upward routing to the sink node is handled by having each node on the path forward traffic through a preferred parent. When determining the preferred parent, the rank property is of utmost importance. The rank is computed based on the defined objective function (OF) for each RPL instance [7] .
According to RFC 6552 [17] , an OF is criteria that aims to optimize the routing paths in a network. The authors of [18] explain that the expected transmission count (ETX) is the most commonly used OF in RPL and is a measure of the number of expected transmissions required to successfully transmit a data packet. In [18] , it was concluded that ETX provides better performance in a scaled network environment, regardless of the radio models used.
To facilitate the preferred parent selection process and to manage routes within the network, RPL adopts four types of control messages. RPL control messages are encapsulated in Internet Control Management Protocol IPv6 (ICMPv6) messages. The control messages are: DODAG Information Solicitation (DIS), DODAG Information Object (DIO), Destination Advertisement Object (DAO), and Destination Advertisement Object Acknowledgement (DAO-ACK) [7] .
The DIO control message is the most commonly exchanged. Multicast DIO messages are sent from the parent or sink node during a route discovery phase or in response to a DIS message when a new node joins the network. It contains critical topology information necessary for the RPL neighbor discovery process, parent selection process, as well as route maintenance process. The message format for a DIO message is shown in Fig. 1 . The flags and reserved fields, which are currently unused, are exploited for the development of the trust-based security architecture presented in this paper. In this section, we define the conceptual framework and the associated building blocks for implementing our trust-based security architecture for RPL in a mobile setting. Figure 2 illustrates the various components of the architecture and how each mechanism guards against specific threat vectors, including DoS attacks and identity/Sybil attacks. The mobile trust-based security architecture works such that the preferred parent of a node is selected based on a modified rank computation. The neighbor with the highest computed bestN eighborV alue will be selected as a preferred parent. The bestN eighbourV alue is calculated as a function of 1) normalized OF, 2) a trust value, and 3) ARSSI value. While the OF is an inherent part of the rank calculation in RPL, we introduced the use of a trust value and ARSSI value in our algorithm to track the behavior of neighboring nodes. We use ETX as the minimizing OF in our simulations.
A trust value is a form of soft security in which nodes use interactions with other nodes to identify malicious nodes and avoid communication with them. We adopt a simple, binary trust model rather than a more complicated probabilistic trust model to minimize nodal computation, thereby reducing power consumption [19] .
The trust value is defined to be between 0 and 1 with 0 denoting an untrusted node and 1 being a trusted node. The trust value is calculated based on Eq. 1, where w 1 is the trust weight factor between 0 and 1. The trust value increases when a trusted event occurs. The notion of a trusted event is defined in Sections III-B.1-III-B.3.
trustV alue = trustV alue + w 1
Conversely, the trust value is decreased based on Eq. 2, when a malicious event occurs. In this case, w 2 is the malicious weight factor between 0 and 1. The notion of a malicious event is defined in Sections III-B.1-III-B.3.
For simplicity and ease of implementation, we define the weights (w 1 and w 2 in Eqs. 1 and 2, respectively) as follows:
• trustValue = 1 (for trusted event, set w 1 = 1)
• trustValue = 0 (for malicious event, set w 2 = 0) In the case of mobile nodes, their signal strength changes according to movement patterns. In our proposed architecture, the mobile node considers the ARSSI value in determining the best neighbor. The parent node is selected based on the neighbor with the highest bestN eighbourV alue. The calculation of the bestN eighborV alue is shown in Eq. 3.
1) Nonce ID: One of the strategies to protect against network attacks is to uniquely identify each node such that an attacker can not gain entry to the network. We propose the use of a nonce ID. The nonce ID is a unique identity that is generated and assigned to each network member during the formulation of the DODAG. The nonce ID is transmitted along with the DIO control message. The trust algorithm works such that when a node receives a DIO message, it checks the nonce ID field for the legitimacy of the sender's identity. If it is valid, it indicates a trusted event and increments the trust value for that particular sender. In the case where the nonce ID is deemed not valid, it indicates a malicious event and decrements the trust value for that sender accordingly. To avoid adding additional bytes to the transmission overhead, we use the reserved field found within the DIO message to send the nonce ID. This field was originally reserved for flags and initialized to zero. The modified DIO message with the nonce ID is shown in Fig. 3 2) Network Whitelist: While each nonce ID is unique, we assessed that it is still relatively easy for an attacker to circumvent this protection. In the case of a Sybil attack, the attacker can separately develop a wide set of identities with the hope that one of the IDs represents that of a trusted node. To protect against such attacks, we use a network association scheme in the form of a network whitelist table that is formulated during the construction of the DODAG. The trust algorithm works such that when a DIO message is received, the receiver checks the combination of nonce ID and IP address of the sender against the network whitelist. If it is valid, the sender increments the trust value associated with the sender. Otherwise, the sender decrements the trust value associated with the sender.
As shown in Fig. 4 , for each node in the network, the network whitelist table captures the identity and IP address of the node. This unique mapping provides an added level of security against randomly generated identity attacks. 3) Timestamp: Another strategy to prevent malicious entry into the network is to track the timeliness of a message in transit. We use a timestamp to monitor the exchange of control messages. For the timestamp option to be effective, all the nodes must have synchronized clocks. We adopt the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) to replace local clocks as the reference time for the timestamp function [20] . Since a DIO message is the most commonly transmitted message used in the RPL protocol, we monitor the timeliness and consistency of the exchange of DIO messages between network members. The time difference between successive DIO messages should be relatively consistent and within a threshold of 500ms. This time difference is recorded as the timestamp and transmitted as part of the DIO message as shown in Fig. 3 The algorithm works such that when the timestamp is above the threshold value, it indicates a trusted event and the trust value associated with the sender will be incremented. In contrast, when the timestamp is below the threshold value, it indicates a malicious event and the trust value will be decremented accordingly.
IV. SIMULATION MODEL AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The network topology used for the simulation consists of a static Command and Control (C2) node (also known as a server/sink node) and multiple static sensors for area surveillance, as well as one moving sensor for the purpose of security patrolling. We use human walking speed of between 1 m/s and 2 m/s to represent the mobile node in our simulations.
The simulation considers a wireless mobile system with each node equipped with a 5m-transmission range. In terms of a propagation model, we use the unit disk graph medium (UDGM) model which is commonly used for IoT simulations [21] . The Random Walk is used as the mobility model.
The Contiki Operating System (OS) v3.0 along with its Cooja network simulator is used to simulate and validate our proposed trust-based security architecture against stipulated threat scenarios. One of the open source implementations of the Contiki OS is ContikiRPL. We use ContikiRPL and modify it accordingly to include our proposed trust-based security architecture. UDP is used and the duration of each simulation is a maximum of 300 seconds.
V. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

A. Protection Against Sybil Attacks
A Sybil attack can be considered as an advanced form of identity or spoofing attack where an adversary forges the identities of legitimate nodes in the network.
A systematic approach to validate the implementation of our algorithm to protect against Sybil attacks (in terms of route formulation) was adopted. We place three Sybil attackers (Node 12, 13 and 14 as indicated in cyan in Fig. 5 ) in the network. Since we know that these nodes serve as forwarding nodes between trusted nodes, these nodes are activated sequentially as attackers until the routing breaks down. Without the activation of any attacker, we observed that the RPL routing path formulated from client to server converged to Node 2-11-7-13-4-Node 1. We deliberately activated Node 12 and 13 as two attackers as shown in Fig. 5 . The neighbors of Node 12 and 13 then detect malicious behavior and have to search for a new preferred parent node. Once all the nodes along the path complete their search for a new preferred parent node, the reconstruction of the RPL routing path is completed. The new RPL path converged to Node 2-11-8-14-4-Node 1, as shown in Fig. 5 . This was validated by analyzing the exchange of radio messages as shown in Fig. 5 .
When three separate attackers are activated (Nodes 12, 13, and 14), we observed that the routing path breaks down. Further details on these simulations can be found in [22] .
1) Validating the Nonce ID and Network Whitelist: To ensure that the nonce ID is implemented correctly per our architectural framework, we examined the simulated data packets using Wireshark. Specifically, we inspected the DIO message for a particular transmission. This is shown in Fig. 6 . In this example, the nonce ID is represented in hexadecimal form as 0xDF32. We investigated this field in the DIO messages across the network nodes and validated that each node takes on a different randomly generated number. Contiki's pseudorandom number generator was used to generate the nonce IDs. In conjunction with the nonce ID, a network whitelist is maintained by each trusted node. The whitelist table that was generated for Node 6 is shown in the enclosed blue rectangle in Fig. 7 . Each node is represented uniquely by a nonce ID and a corresponding IPv6 address. For example, as shown in the enclosed red rectangle of Fig. 7 , Node 2 is represented by nonce ID (0x3081) and IPv6 address ending with (0x0202). Node 3 is represented by nonce ID (0x6C7B) and IPv6 address ending with (0x0303). Node 4 represented by nonce ID (0x4B9C) and IPv6 address ending with (0x0404). In the event that an attacker tries to enter the network, it would not possess such a unique pairing, and would be detected as a malicious node.
B. Protection Against DoS Attacks
To evaluate our trust-based security architecture against a DoS attack, we proceeded similarly as with the Sybil attacker scenario. We activated a series of attackers that would execute a DoS attack. Due to space, we do not include these results here, but can be found in [22] . The DIO message for a particular transmission was inspected. The timestamp information for this DIO message is shown in Fig. 8 . Our timestamp field indicates the time difference between successive DIO messages. In this case, the timestamp takes on a hexadecimal value of 0x199B, which represents 6555ms. Since we have set the detection threshold in our algorithm to be 500ms, this value is within the detection limits and the node is reflected as a trusted node. 2) Validating DoS Attacker: Separately, when we investigated the timestamp value for the malicious node, we observed and validated that the value changes from 0x0F64 to 0x0112 upon the activation of the attacker node. This is shown in Fig. 9 . It can be seen that the timing interval between successive DIO messages drops from 3940ms to 274ms. This exhibits the malicious behavior of a DoS attack where the attacker deliberately transmits multiple control messages to the network so as to deny service to other network members. Since the DIO interval values from the malicious node are lower than the predefined threshold of 500ms, the neighbor nodes will identify this node as a malicious node and create a new routing path from the client to the server node.
C. Control Overhead
In a typical DIO message that is encapsulated within an ICMP message, the total number of bytes is 86. The nonce ID does not affect the total number of control bytes. The nonce Fig. 9 . Validating the implementation of a DoS attacker ID is implemented in the Flags and Reserved fields of the DIO message (this is shown in Fig. 3 ), which are otherwise unused. The timestamp value used to track the exchange of DIO messages to protect against DoS attacks, incurs two additional bytes, in the Options field of the DIO message. To facilitate mobility functions, we added two more bytes within the Options field to track the ARSSI value of neighboring nodes to improve the handover process. Consequently, in this case the total amount of overhead is four bytes. This is only a 4.6% increase in overhead.
D. Packet Delivery Rate
The packet delivery rate (PDR) is defined as the number of packets received successfully over the total number of packets sent. The nodes are positioned with a separation of approximately 4-5m with a transmission range of 5m. Since the speed of a human can vary, our simulation considers an average speed of 1 m/s and 2 m/s such that the effects of mobility can be investigated. We first conducted simulations for over 600 seconds based on the Mobility Path 1 shown in Fig. 10 . The corresponding PDR results are shown in Fig. 11 . In the case where the client node is static, the PDR is 100% for both the standard RPL algorithm and the trust-based RPL algorithm. However, for the case when the client node is moving, we observed that the modified algorithm outperforms the standard algorithm by approximately 8-10%. This is primarily due to the considerations of the ARSSI in a moving node. We also observed that the PDR degrades slightly by 3-5% when we increase the movement speed from 1 m/s to 2 m/s. This is largely due to the need to stabilize the network when the movement speed of the node increases. We inserted another mobile path to the simulation, mobile path 2 to verify the consistency of the results (Fig. 10) . In this case, we simulated using a movement speed of 1 m/s and compared the PDR results with that of mobile path 1. The PDR results are shown in Fig. 12 . From the results, we verified that the modified RPL algorithm continues to outperform the standard RPL in both mobile path configurations. However, we observed that the PDR varies largely across different topology and mobility configurations [22] . 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed and validated the implementation of a lightweight trust-based security architecture for RPL in a mobile IoT network. We successfully demonstrated that the algorithm can protect the network against specific attacks such as Sybil attacks and DoS attacks. The results from extensive simulations also demonstrated that our proposed algorithm outperforms that of the standard RPL algorithm in terms of PDR. The tradeoff associated with this improvement is only a 4.6% increase in network overhead. In our future work, we will study the energy consumption undertaken by the IoT devices due to our architecture and also expand the number of mobile nodes used.
